The concept of risk assumes different meanings according to different typologies of activities developed within varied application fields. Therefore various definitions of this concept exist, but in general the risk is measured in terms of a combination of two variables that concern two different aspects of an harmful event: the Frequency and the Impact. However, to guarantee the continuity of the operations and the activities, the simple measurement of the risk is not enough: it also needs to consider the management of the risks of interruption of the services and their recovery to a particular level of efficiency within a particular timescale. So also the variable time must be considered to handle risk. This is why Business Continuity Management could be complementary to Operational Risk Management to improve the efficiency of an organization in delivering either a service or a product. The objective of this paper is to provide some examples of how statistical models can be used to define the timeframe for recovery the activities and to analyze interruptions.
Introduction
Business Continuity Management (BCM) is a procedure that involves some management activities integrated at different levels. BCM combines elements including risk assessment, business impact analysis, risk mitigation and contingency planning into one cohesive and comprehensive unique procedure, (Stanton (2005) ). For example in BCM we can see Risk Management procedure, disaster recovery, security and other tasks. This means that there are some overlaps among different activities, standard and guidelines as ISO 17799 (or BS 7799), Basel 2, (BIS (2005) , BIS (2006)), COSO (COSO (2004) ), etc. However, now the BCM follows its own British Standard called BS 25999-1:2006 . Mainly a BCM establishes a strategic and operational framework to implement, proactively, an organization's resilience to disruption, interruption or loss in supplying its products and services (PAS56 (2003)). Moreover it can be applied to every organization's size so it could be a strategic advance for medium and small enterprise and also less expensive compared to a standard Risk Management system. The lifecycle of a BCM is compound by five principal parts as shown in figure 1. The first step is to understand the significant elements called Mission Critical Activities (MCA) which are the critical operational and/or business support, service or product related activities (internal or external), including their dependencies and single points of failure, which enable an organisation to achieve its business objective(s). MCAs' identification is essential to enable a BCM and develop a business continuity plan, (PAS56 (2003) ). Within this step there is the core of Business Continuity functions called Business Impact Analysis (BIA). The BIA identifies, quantifies and qualifies the business impacts of a loss, interruption or disruption of business processes on an organisation and provides the data to develop an appropriate business continuity strategy. Moreover, it quantifies the timescale into which the interruption of each business function becomes unacceptable to the organisation. The main purposes of a BIA is to identify the minimum level of resources required to enable an organization to achieve the recovery of a MCA to a default level of functionality. These resources (defined the MCA) are function of two main variables: the Recovery Time Objective (RTO) and the Recovery Point Objective (RPO). The RTO is the time scale in which the MCA must be recovered, instead the RPO is the amount of work that should be restored following an interruption or a disruption of a MCA. It is inside the BIA that must be searched the principal interactions and the differences between Risk Management (RM) and Business Continuity Management. In fact the key parameters for BCM are Time and Impact, for RM they are Impact and Frequency. Besides, the risk assessment in the BCM is performed only on the MCA instead of the whole pool of processes and activities performed by RM. Following figure 1 the second step concerns the determination and selection of alternative operating methods to be used to maintain the organisation's MCAs after an incident, to an acceptable minimum level. The BCM strategy will ensure BCM activities to be synchronized with and to support the organisation's general strategy. This step is key to ensure resilience and high reliability of the continuance of MCAs. The third step is the developing and implementing of a BCM plan (BCP). It is a methodology used to create a plan for how an organization will resume partially or completely interrupted critical activities within a predetermined time after an interruption and disruption. The detail of each component part of a BCP depends upon the nature, scale and complexity of the organization, based upon its risk profile, risk appetite and the environment in which it operates. The BCP methodology gives to BCM the capability to be scalable at any organisation's size. For example in large organisations, it may be more practical to have plan's components as separate documents and refer to each as an individual plan. Within smaller organizations, it will most probably be practical to cover each of these component parts within a single document and refer to it as the BCP, (PAS56 (2003)).
Step number four of figure one is dedicated to establish the necessary culture of BCM within an organization to guarantee its self-growth. The purpose of this step is to permit at the BCM to become an integral part of the organisation's strategic and day-to-day business-as-usual operational management as a result of embedding a BCM culture. The last step is needed to evaluate and enable the continuous improvement of the organisations BCM competence and capability, to ensure the BCM remains effective and to control the BCM via audit processes. (For more detail about this and the other step please refer to PAS56 or to the new BS 25999). Among all steps here we focus on the first step in particular to the BIA and the concept of RTO. The goal of this article is to propane some statistical models to analyze interruption and the RTO. The chosen models are survival analysis and bayesian networks. We will thus describe synthetically the used models and show some practical applications of such models.
Models
The main used models to obtain our tasks are the survival model for proportional risks called Cox model and the Bayesian Networks (BN). The choice of these models is due to their flexibility in adapting to different situations and in particular for what concerns the BN for the knowledge-base property as well. Starting from a database with information about interruption on a particular field we will choose the input necessary to perform the analysis as schematize in figure 2. Such a scheme is general in data mining activity (Giudici (2003) ). Depending upon what we want to obtain, we can use one model instead of another one. 
Cox models for survival analysis
The Cox proportional-hazards regression for survival data is a model to simultaneously explore the effects of several variables on survival time. It is well known in medicine to investigate the survival of a patient in function of particular treatment and of other information as age, geographic area and so on. In this case the event to be investigated is the mortality of the patient. Such analysis is done by estimating the hazard function that is the probability that an individual will experience an event (for example, death) within a small time interval, given that the individual has survived up to the beginning of the interval (Cox and Oakes (1984) , Cox (1972) , Lawless (1982) ). It can therefore be interpreted as the risk of dying at time t. The hazard or risk to experiment the event at time t is:
Where h 0 (t) is a baseline hazard that can take any form and corresponds to the probability of dying (or reaching an event) when all the explanatory variables are zero (similar to the intercept in a classical regression model); x i are covariate variables (or explanatory variables of the multiple regression); β i are the regression coefficients and give the proportional change that can be expected in the hazard, related to changes in the explanatory variables. When such a coefficient has positive (or negative) sign the hazard will increase (or decrease) with the growth of the covariate. Cox's method does not assume a particular distribution for the survival times, but rather assumes that the effects of the different variables on survival are constant over time and are additive in a particular scale. The assumption of a constant relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables is called proportional hazard (Cox and Oakes (1984) , Cox (1972) ).
Bayesian Networks
In the Risk Management activities the Bayesian Networks (BN) are a useful tool for a multivariate and integrated analysis of the risks, for their monitoring and for the evaluation of intervention strategies, (Alexander (2003) , Bonafede and Giudici (2007) , Neil et al. (2005) , Cornalba et al. (2006) , Cornalba and Giudici (2007) ). A BN is a directed acyclic graph (probabilistic expert system) in which every node represents a random variable with a discrete or continuous state (Cowell et al. (1999) , Murphy (2003) , Heckerman (1996) ). The relationships among variables, pointed out by arcs (see figure 3 ), are interpreted in terms of conditional probabilities according to Bayes theorem. In this way we have a graphical integrated view of the joint probability. With the BN is implemented the concept of conditional independence that allows the factorization of the joint probability, through the Markov property, in a series of local terms that describe the relationships among variables:
Where pa(x i ) denotes the states of the parents of the variable Xi (child). This factorization enable us to study the network locally. One of the problems of a BN is that it requires an appropriate database to extract the conditional probabilities (parameter learning problem) and the network structure (structural learning problem), (Bonafede and Giudici (2007) , Cowell et al. (1999) , Jensen (2001) , Heckerman (1996) , Giudici (2003) ). The objective is to find the net that best approximates the joint probabilities and the dependencies among variables. The data used to learn the network can be quantitative (measured or assessed by expert) or qualitative (assessed by an expert). Moreover, qualitative data must be converted either in numerical value or a bound to be used in the model. Once we have constructed the network one of the common goal of a BN is the probabilistic inference to estimate the state probabilities of nodes given the knowledge of the values of others nodes. The inference can be done from children to parents (this is called diagnosis) or vice versa from parents to children (this is called prediction), (Murphy (2003) ).
Application
Now we show some practical examples of application of the models described above. We use two databases coming from a telecommunication company; such data are related to PBX (Private Branch Exchange) which is a private telephone network used within an enterprise. Users of the PBX share a certain number of outside lines for making telephone calls external to the PBX. The information available in the first database (see table 1) are about the client, the type of customer, the PBX interruption date, the type of problem (classified in five categories), the severity (categorized in three levels) and some other information related to the client as number of smart phone, number of lines, etc. Such data are gathered after the callcentre operator is not able to solve the problem and as a consequence it is shifted to the technician. In the second database there are the log-files, generated from the PBX device, in which there are the date and cause of the last system boot, the cause flag alarms and other additional information. These files are generated automatically by periodic check procedures or recalled by the technician (see table 1 ). We use the first database with Cox model to analyze the probability to have again an interruption as a function of problem description and customer type, in this way we give a categorical score for each intersection problem-customer (IPC). This procedure is useful to understand which IPC is more subject to interruption and to take decisions about the resource to address at this type of interruption, in order to resume it. The second database is used with a BN to give a priorization cause check list in function of alarms, in fact having this information the technician can start to verify interruption problems starting from the most probable cause. In this manner the technician time to recover the interruption is optimized. We have created a third database using the first database and simulating the time for recovery to link together problem, severity, recovery time and customer type via bayesian networks (see table 1 ). Time has been simulated by mean of a Gaussian distribution whose mean value and variance vary in function of severity, problem and customer type by following the idea that problem and customer with high severity will have high recovery time. In table 1 there are samples of the three databases. In the first kind of database there are 5 types of problem description: Software, Interface, Network Communications, Security; 3 types of severity (which is a categorical impact of a problem): one (low), two (medium), three (high); 20 customer types, such as Banking, Defense, Hotel, Health, etc.. In the second database there are 16 cause's types (as "Power UP", "Reset LD", etc.) and 18 alarms (as PCM time slot, Card Subunit, etc.). 
Cox model application
Before using the survival model we standardize "the open date and time" starting from zero (that is the first of October) which is the starting recording date of database. Then we translate in minutes the time of occurrence by counting from zero. Afterwards, in order to use a survival model we have to choose a target event. For our purposes we select as event the occurrence that a client calls more than one time. So we add a column called EVENT to identify where there are recurrent PBX calling. When a client (identified by PBX number) has its last call we insert 0, otherwise 1 as shown in figure 4 . Then one more column is added to differentiate the time of recurrent PBX calling from another with only one call. So we have a column named "END time" that is the instant of calling and "START time" that is zero if the PBX calls one time, or the time at the previous step if the PBX calls again (see figure 4) . In this case starting and ending times are necessary to consider recurrent events. Analyzing this database with this model, we are able to give the relative risk of each problem by: classifying information with customer type (see table 2); following a stepwise procedure and, finally, checking regression coefficients p-value (i.e. selecting the configuration with all p<0.05). The result of the procedure is the selection of two model components. Component one links all the variables that give a decreasing hazard, this means that when we have an interruption, for example, due to "Software" the probability to call again is decreased by 44% when we hold constant the other variables. For "Severity" we have, generally, that when we move from severity one (low) to severity three (high) the probability to call again decrease by 14%. This means that technicians pay more attention to high level problems than low level problem and that low level problems are more frequent as it happens usually. Component two instead groups the problems that give an increasing hazard, therefore if we have a problem related to "Network Communication" the probability to call again increase by 81%. This means that such problem is difficult to solve and we must deliver more resources to avoid it. In this way we are able to assign a score to problems and severities. The best case is "Software" and the worst case is "NetComms". From these results we have also the hazard and the probability, related to each customer, to call again (the survival curve) in function of time (see figure 5 ).
Figure 5: Example of survival curve (black) and hazard (grey) for customer BANKING.
Using the hazard, which is a numerical vector as can be seen in figure 5 , we calculate for each customer the riskiness to experiment the event to call again and adding this information to the hazard related to the problem we can assign a score to each IPC as show in table 3. The riskiness (D) is calculated by adding the values of vector normalized by its max value and dividing with the normalized temporal interval. The formula is: where h i j is the hazard at time t i j , h M j is the maximum hazard, t m j is the first instant in which we can see the event, t M j is the time of the last occurrence and with j we indicate the customer type.
In table 3 we can see that the combinations Interface-Finance and NetComms-Finance are the worst cases for the two components. The best situations are Software-Bank and Hardware-Bank. In this way we can decide to spend more resource and control budget on the worst case.
Bayesian Networks application
In this case we apply the BN in two directions. The first one is to link boot cause and alarms using a database of the form described table 1. This is useful to understand what cause is more probable when an alarms is switched on. So when an alarm is active the technician will start his work from the most probable cause to save time. In figure 6 there is the learned network using only the two columns "causes" and "alarms".
Starting from this network we are able to decide which is the most probable cause by selecting an alarm in the second node and to see as the new probabilities are distributed among causes in the first node (see figure 7) . Then we can order the cause from the most probable to the least and so we are able to do a diagnosis cause-alarm.
As we can see in figure 7(a) when there is the alarm CARD the most probable cause is RESETLD, then the second is POWERUP, the third is SPVDUP and so on, instead for alarm CHECKSUM ( figure 7(b) ) the cause H0 must be the first one to be checked by technician to solve the problem. In this manner the recovery time is optimized. The second BN is learned with the database in table 1. This is the most complete example to be used for business continuity management, because the scope is to understand how to set the recovery time for each IPC. Before learning the network, the recovery time has been discretized by using a kmeans clustering in six clusters: c1 ( In figure 8 there is the network learned from the database and its structure reflects the simulation idea expressed above. By using this BN we are able to understand which is the most probable severity in function of customer, problem and recovery time.
For example for customers banking and defense we can construct table 4 where we show, after having selected the recovery time, as the severity changes with time. If we see the problem hardware, for banking we can decide to set the recovery time within 24-32 minutes and there is the probability to have a severity one (low) of 90%, instead for defense if we accept a severity two (medium) with probability 78% we can recover within 30-40 minutes. Moreover, for "Banking" we can note that for the problem "Interface" in 17-24 minutes we have a severity two with probability 61% that is the second highest after severity one and then the severity decreases again but with low probability, so in this case is better to stay into 24 minutes.
We remark that knowing just the categorical severity is not sufficient to decide the recover time, because we need to identify also the cost of intervention at different times and also to quantify the severity. Thereby in order to offer a more clear example we have decided to set a cost for the recovery and the severity as shown in table 5. For recovery we have thought that to be able to recover in less time we need to move more amount of resource so the cost is decreasing in some way with time. For severity we have assigned a severity slightly high for banking as shown in table 5. By using the cost above we are able to quantify the operation of recovery an interruption in function of typology of problem and customers. The results are in table 6. In this situation, for example, recovery an interruption due to "Software" for "Defense" within 42-54 minutes will cost 2150 (with probability of 92%) which is less than recovery the similar interruption problem for "Banking" in the same time. For "Defense" and "Banking", in figure 14 , to recover within 42-54 minutes have the same severity and an highest probability but in this case the two cases are weighted in different manner. Besides, always for "Defense", if there are in the same time all the interruptions and there is not a particular priority for recovery we are able to define the most probable list and cost for recovery showed in table 7. From table 7 we can see that Interface is the first to be recovered and Software the last. The cost for the plan is of 9700 with a probability of 68% that is the product of the all events. Instead if there is a priority we can decide how to move and evaluate some plans as table 8. The most probable plan in table 8 is B and costs 12850 (28%) then there is C that costs 12200 (23%) and, at last, A which is 10700 (9%). These three plans are obtained just by shifting the RTO of the first interruption that is due to hardware problem. It is not convenient to move beyond 32 minutes for recovering hardware because then all severities grow up and costs raise. Moreover, we can calculate also the expected cost by adding the products between severity probabilities and their costs plus the intervention cost. The probabilities come from the severity node (figure 8) when we select a specific customer, problem and recovery time.
As for example if we select Banking, Security and time between 24 and 32 minutes we have:
Severity1: 30%; Severity2: 65%; Severity3: 5% Expected Cost = (0.30x1000+0.65x2500+0.03x4000)+500 = 2625
The results are in table 9. In the tables above we have the highest probable values, in this situation there is the expected cost. In this manner we have also the expected loss (that coincides with cost) when time varies. Using these results we can calculate the expected cost of interventions plans which are shown in table 10. In this case we have that where the probability in tables 7 and 8 is high, the cost is close to the expected one, instead where the probability is low there is a big difference. The intervention plan X of table 10 is the situation where there is not a previous priority list and in this case there is a different from the plan in table 7, in fact here we recover "Hardware" problem before of "Network Communication" when instead in the other plan we recovery firstly "Network Communications". The other plans, of course, are equal to the plans before.
